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Handbook updates 
For those of you subscribing 
to the handbook, the following 
updates are included.
Farmland Value Survey 
(Iowa State University) – 
C2-70 (8 pages) 
Dividing Business Income – 
C4-16 (3 pages) 
Business Arrangements – 
C4-40 (2 pages) 
Partnership – C4-46 (2 pages) 
Corporation – C4-47 (3 pages) 
Please add these files to your 
handbook and remove the  
out-of-date material.
continued on page 6
In early 2013, farmers in Iowa and across the Midwest braced for a difficult corn market, 
with prices declining from $7/
bushel in late 2012 to $4/bushel 
in early 2015, and finally settling 
at $3/bushel. Shielded from the 
world market, corn producers in 
China enjoyed a steady elevated 
corn price of almost $10/bushel 
from 2011 until 2015—largely 
a result of China’s obscure price 
floor corn policy. While China’s 
corn production is mainly used 
for domestic consumption, policy 
changes in Chinese corn markets 
have trade implications for the 
global corn, beef, and pork sectors. 
For example, in September 2016, 
the United States filed a complaint 
with the World Trade Organization 
over China’s excessive subsidies 
to corn, rice, and wheat farmers 
(OUSTR 2016). In this article, we 
will talk about why China ended 
its 9-year-old corn price support 
policy, and more importantly, what 
is China’s new corn policy. This will 
be the first in a quarterly series of Ag 
Decision Maker articles on Chinese 
agriculture and Chinese economy.
China’s costly corn support 
price program 2007–2016
Corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans 
are major crops in China, and 
Chinese farmers have been paying 
agricultural taxes to grow these 
crops for almost two thousand 
years. In 2004, China switched from 
taxing corn farmers to providing 
subsidies for seed and machine 
purchases. To further boost rural 
income and ensure national food 
security, China started a nationwide 
corn stockpiling program in 2007. 
A key feature of this policy is that 
the government collects corn from 
farmers at minimum support prices, 
which are typically substantially 
higher than market prices. This 
significantly distorts the market—
artificially elevated support prices 
have enticed farmers to grow corn 
and sell to the state storage facilities, 
while rising labor costs due to the 
increased rural income from this 
support policy have kept corn prices 
high. Figure 1 shows historical corn 
futures prices in China and the 
United States—clearly revealing that 
from 2007 to 2016 China’s policy 
drove corn prices up to two or three 
times that of U.S. corn prices. It 
seems that China’s support price 
program has gone through two 
phases: (a) from 2007 to 2010, the 
target support price for corn tracked 
closely to the corn import price 
plus a 65 percent out-of-quota duty; 
and (b) in 2011, China unveiled a 
fixed and extremely costly support 
price policy that kept futures prices 
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between $9 to $10/bushel for almost  
five years.
The high corn prices created incentives  
for Chinese farmers to produce 
more corn (see Figure 2). Farmers 
planted corn in grasslands, deserts, on 
mountainsides, and in marshes under the 
high corn price, increasing total acres to 
95 million—a 26 percent increase from 
2006 to 2015 (Li 2016). In 2012, corn 
exceeded rice in production to become 
China’s largest grain crop (SCD 2015). 
Impact of the support price policy on 
corn storage and financial cost
As Figure 3 shows, China’s escalating 
corn storage is a noticeable outcome 
of the price support policy—China 
and the United States had roughly the 
same ending stocks in 2006/07, but in 
2015/16, China’s were almost double the 
U.S. supply. Increased storage was the 
intention of the Chinese government, 
but is more a result of excessive 
production, import demand triggered by 
the support price policy, and a lack of 
domestic demand. In fact, warehouses 
in northeastern China currently have no 
room to store grain. More interestingly, 
Chinese corn storage accumulated 
faster after China unveiled the $9 to 
$10/bushel fixed support prices in 
early 2011. By the end of 2015, China 
had stored enough corn for at least six 
months of domestic consumption. In 
contrast, the global average storage-to-
consumption ratio is roughly 20 percent.
The stockpiling and support price 
policy has a steep price tag for 
China—the Chinese government faces 
significant financial burden due to high 
procurement prices. USDA estimated 
this policy has cost China more than 
$10 billion (Ballard 2016). The price 
support policy also took a toll on China’s 
aging storage facilities. In addition to 
corn degradation caused by structural deficiencies 
of warehouses, problems like mismanagement were 
commonplace; in fact, Chinese state television reported 
officials profited from selling inferior grains at new grain 
prices, dubbing them “rats in warehouses” (Hornby 
Figure 2. Production and consumption of corn in China and the 
U.S., 2000–2016
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Figure 1. China and U.S. corn futures prices, 2005–2016 
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Chinese November corn futures prices from Dalian Exchange, and U.S. 
December corn futures prices from Chicago CME Group Inc.
2015). Some industry analysts estimate that over 20 
MMT of corn reserves are so moldy or deteriorated that 
they are no longer suitable for human consumption 
or feed use (Gale, Jewison, and Hansen 2014). Due to 
the huge financial and storage burden, this stockpiling 
program was discontinued by the Chinese government 
in March 2016. 
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The spatial mismatch in China’s 
corn demand and supply
The corn support policy also led to a 
drop in domestic corn consumption 
as well as a substantial increase in the 
import of corn substitutes. This is due 
to the high domestic corn price and a 
spatial mismatch between where corn is 
grown and where it is used. As Figure 5 
shows, major corn production occurs in 
four northeastern provinces in China, 
while the corn demand, proxied by 
leading pork production regions with 
at least five percent of the national 
pork production, is mainly located 
in central and southern provinces of 
China. Corn in China is mainly used 
for feed, and transportation costs 
from the production to consumption 
areas makes imported feed a cheaper 
alternative (Iowa Farm Bureau 2014). 
In contrast, Figure 6 plots the spatial 
location of major corn and pork 
production states in the U.S. with 
at least three percent of the national 
production, and it clearly reveals that 
in general the U.S. corn demand, 
proxied by pork production, coincides 
well with the U.S. corn production. 
Iowa and other Corn Belt states, lead 
both the national production of corn 
and pork. In both China and the U.S., 
there are major pork production areas 
closer to population centers and ports, 
such as Guangdong in China and 
North Carolina. However, in the U.S., 
the spatial overlap in the demand and 
supply of corn significantly reduces the 
need for long-distance transportation 
for domestic consumption. In addition, 
the ethanol plants in the U.S. tend to 
cluster in the Corn Belt as well.
Competitiveness of Chinese 
domestic corn with corn imported from the U.S.
The steep corn support price drove up the cost of corn 
domestically produced in China for feed significantly, 
corn end-users in China (e.g., feed processing plants, 
livestock producers, bio-refineries) need to tradeoff 
between domestic corn and imported corn. On the one 
hand, corn produced in northeastern China has a steep 
support price plus a roughly 15 percent transportation 
cost; on the other hand, imported corn has a 65 percent 
out-of-quota duty for imports beyond the quota, 
plus barging costs and a $20/ton ocean transport fee. 
Figure 1 shows the 65 percent out-of-quota duty upon 
imported U.S. No. 2 corn prices, revealing that Chinese 
corn was still too expensive from 2013 to 2015. 
As a result, massive amounts of corn and corn 
substitutes (sorghum, barley, DDGS, cassava chips, and 
Figure 3. China and U.S. corn ending stocks, 2000–2016
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Figure 4. China corn, sorghum, barley, and oat imports, 2005–2016
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cassava starch) were imported by China. 
In particular, Figure 4 reveals China’s 
imports of corn, sorghum, and barley 
have more than quadrupled from 2011 
to 2015 compared to low steady levels 
from 2005 to 2006. This is likely driven 
by the dramatic policy shift to a steep 
support price of $9 to $10/bushel in 
2011 (Figure 1).
China’s new corn subsidy 
program
To replace the state stockpiling program 
and support price policy, China adopted 
a direct payment corn subsidy policy 
tied to planted acres in spring 2016—a 
policy familiar to U.S. farmers. China’s 
Ministry of Finance will allocate a 
30-billion-yuan corn subsidy ($4.51 
billion) to farmers in four provinces 
in northeastern China, which boasts 
more than 60 percent of China’s corn 
production (Patton and Hogue 2016), 
in the 2016/17 crop year. The payment 
in each county will vary depending on 
the ratio of funds to area planted in 
corn, ranging from U.S. $109 to $163 
per acre with an average of $137 per 
acre (150 yuan per mu) (Dim Sums 
2016b,c).
Figure 7 compares the cost of 
production for benchmark corn 
farms in Heilongjiang Province in 
northeast China and Iowa from the 
Agri-Benchmark project. In particular, 
this separates the cost of production 
into direct costs (e.g., cost for seed, 
fertilizer, plant protection, irrigation, 
and crop insurance), operating costs 
(e.g., machinery cost, labor, and energy 
costs), and land costs. While we only 
have data for Chinese farms in 2012 and 
2013, it shows that when Iowa farms 
have a total production cost around 
$4 to $5/bushel, it costs the Chinese 
farmers in northeast China $7/bushel, 
which is roughly more than 40 percent 
higher than their U.S. counterparts. The soil conditions 
in northeast China are very similar to the “black” soils 
in Iowa but the lack of efficient machinery accounts 
for the major cost difference. After China ended the 
support price policy, the Chinese domestic corn price 
is roughly the same as the effective price for corn 
imported from the U.S. with the 65 percent out-of-quota 
duty (Figure 1). As a result, currently the domestic corn 
produced in Northeast China could potentially account 
Figure 5. Major corn and pork production provinces in China 
Data source: www.statista.com/statistics/242632/corn-production-in-china-by-
region/; chinaag.org/services/production/
Figure 6. Major corn and pork production states in the U.S.
Data source: USDA NASS
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for a higher share used by the end-
users, and the new direct subsidy could 
mitigate part of the gaps in the Chinese 
corn production cost compared with 
the U.S. Corn Belt cost.
China is now also employing multiple 
measures to cut corn production and 
storage. First, the Chinese government 
just permitted state-owned companies 
to export about two million metric 
tons of corn to neighboring countries 
including Central Asia (Dim Sums 
2016a). Second, China’s Ministry of 
Agriculture is forecasting a 5-million-
acre reduction in corn in 2016 due 
to the dramatically lower corn price, 
especially in fringe production areas 
out of the four northeast provinces 
(MAPRC 2015). Corn acreage is 
projected to drop from 93 million acres 
to around 86 million acres in 2018–
2020 (Dim Sums 2015), and converted 
corn acreage is projected to go to 
soybeans, potatoes, other coarse grains, and fodder 
crops. Third, companies and interest groups have been 
lobbying the Chinese government to subsidize the use 
of stored corn for biofuel production. 
Implications for U.S. agriculture
China is the largest and third-largest importer of U.S. 
soybeans and pork, respectively; therefore, it is critically 
important to assess China’s corn policy and its impacts 
on U.S. agriculture. In the short run, it seems China 
will embrace a direct payment corn subsidy program, 
similar to what the United States adopted about two 
decades ago. As a measure to decrease stored corn, 
China is offering corn exports at lower prices than 
the United States and Brazil, which could potentially 
put a downward pressure on the global corn market. 
However, the poor quality of stored corn might hinder 
China’s role in the global corn export market. In the 
meantime, China’s imports of corn substitutes might 
decrease in order to encourage domestic consumption. 
This year’s Document Number One, the name given to 
an annual statement to emphasize the significance of 
agriculture by Chinese leaders in January, said for the 
first time that China would “carefully promote” GM 
food crops. In China’s 13th Five-Year-Plan (2016-2020), 
China’s State Council set R&D and commercialization 
of genetically modified crops as one of their priorities. 
However, this will not directly translate into imports 
of GMO seeds from the U.S. since the plan implies that 
GMO seeds will be supplied by Chinese companies. 
In the medium and long run, China is downplaying the 
strategic role of corn, and only regarding wheat and 
rice as its two main food crops, which may suggest the 
possibility of a transition from a target of self-sufficiency 
towards greater involvement in the global marketplace. 
As the Chinese people demand more pork and beef with 
rising per-capita income, China will likely need more 
corn and corn substitutes in the future. This need will 
be amplified with limited arable land, degrading soil 
quality, and an exodus of rural youth to cities. USDA 
projects that China will need to import significant 
amounts of corn—up to 22 MMT—by 2023/24 (Hansen 
and Gale 2014). The United States, along with Ukraine 
and Brazil, would likely be a major player if that were  
to happen.
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Internet Updates
The following Information Files and Decision Tools have been updated on www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm.
Making the Transition from Conventional to Organic Production – A1-26 (Decision Tool) 
Farmland Lease Annual Report – C2-06 (2 pages) 
Dividing Business Income – C4-16 (Decision Tool) 
Iowa Beginning Farmer Tax Credits and Loan Programs – C4-30 (2 pages) 
Current Profitability
The following tools have been updated on www.extension.iastate.edu/agdm/info/outlook.html. 
Corn Profitability – A1-85 
Soybean Profitability – A1-86
Iowa Cash Corn and Soybean Prices – A2-11
Season Average Price Calculator – A2-15
Ethanol Profitability – D1-10
Biodiesel Profitability – D1-15
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